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This study uses the Pakistan Rural Household Survey 2004-5 (PRHS), a rich set of 
households and school data, to examine parents’ schooling decision in rural Pakistan. Nested 
logit regressions are used to quantify the determinants of child school attendance. The analysis 
confirms that the greater the number of schools (public or private) in the local communities the 
higher is the attendance. Lower school attendance of boys seems to be the outcome of lower 
school quality more than it is for girls. A marginal increase in school quality correlates with 
increased school attendance in government schools more than in private schools. Nearly all 
school quality variables including control for number of schools in a community stand 
insignificant for girls. This shows that other factors might be of more importance than school 
quality of local schools for girl’s low attendance in rural Pakistan. Besides, parental education, 
especially mother’s education, and household income have strong positive impact on child 
school attendance. The greater the number of children in the household the lower is the child 
school attendance. Credit constraint seems not to be problematic as the estimated effect is 
statistically insignificant. The size of landholding seems to be important only in the case of 
girls schooling.  
JEL Classification: I21, I25, D13, C25 
Keywords: Demand for Schooling, Public Education, Private Education, Pakistan 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Childhood in developed economies is a time for school learning, but the high level 
of dropout in poor countries suggests that children in these countries are deprived of 
learning opportunities. At the United Nations in 2000, almost 189 governments agreed to 
the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) that by 2015 every child (boy or girl) should 
complete primary schooling. This consensus substantiates the view of most economists 
and development agencies that schooling promotes individuals’ wellbeing and economic 
development [Zhoa and Glewwe (2010)].  
Pakistan’s educational performance is poor relative to neighbouring countries as 
measured by Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) and Net Enrolment Ratio (NER). In 2004-05 
the country’s adult literacy rate stood at 49.9 percent as compared to Sri Lanka (90.7 
percent), India (61 percent), Iran (82.4 percent) and Indonesia (90.4 percent) [Pakistan 
(2009)]. The Human Development Index for Pakistan was 0.55, which is lower than that 
 
Muhammad Jehangir Khan <jehnangir@pide.org.pk> is Assistant Professor, Pakistan Institute of 
Development Economics, Islamabad. 
178 Muhammad Jehangir Khan 
 
of some countries in the region but slightly better than that for Bangladesh and Nepal. 
Pakistan’s performance is weaker on the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) for health 
and education components than major competitors like India, China, Bangladesh, 
Malaysia and Sri Lanka. In terms of the quality of educational outcomes, Pakistani 
students are well below the international scaled mean of 495 in the Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS). This means that in Pakistani the 
performance of students is poorer than their counterparts in other countries in the region 
except Iran [Pakistan (2009)]. The current estimates show moderate improvement in adult 
literacy ratio (58 percent in 2015-2016) relative to the estimate of 49.9 percent in 2004-
05. Low educational performance is always coupled with regional (rural and urban as 
well as provincial) and gender disparities in education provision. Adult literacy rate for 
males and females is 70 percent and 47 percent respectively. Literacy remains higher in 
urban areas (74 percent), while the rate for rural areas is 49 percent [Pakistan (2015-
2016)]. With low level of literacy, it is most probable that they will have relatively low 
levels of income, social status and living conditions. 
Research on the role of school quality in parental schooling decisions for their 
children from the perspective of public or private schooling is lacking in Pakistan. A few 
studies have used household survey data but these are usually confined to small 
population [e.g. Alderman, et al. (2001)]. Yet, no study has simultaneously considered 
the effects of household income, parental education and school quality in public or 
private schools. Moreover, due to limited data omitted variable bias may confound the 
true effect. This paper has tried to address, among the key questions, the relative 
importance of school quality on the one hand and family characteristics on the other. The 
investigation of these factors, and in particular school quality, will shed light on 
persistent low school attainment or enrolment; as it is plausible that low investment in 
children’s human capital is the major cause of transition of poverty across generations.  
This study uses the Pakistan Rural Household Survey (PRHS), a nationally 
representative dataset of rural households and schools, to investigate the role of school 
quality in child school attendance in rural Pakistan. The analysis estimates the impact of 
factors such as household income, parental education, land size and school quality, on 
school attendance. 
The PRHS contain a comprehensive list of household and school level information 
in rural Pakistan, so the current study is less likely to suffer from omitted variable bias. In 
addition, it contributes to the literature on education in Pakistan in two ways. First, 
studies of the impact of school quality in rural Pakistan are extremely rare from the 
perspective of child school attendance in public or private schools. Secondly, it controls 
for the role of household income or wealth, credit constraint, other demographic 
indicators, along with school quality. School quality plays an important role in school 
attendance, learning and child stay at school for more years [Glewwe and Kremer 
(2006)]. This study analyses the effects of a comprehensive set of school-quality 
attributes on school attendance in public and private schools. 
The results of studies carried out to date, which have focused on the relationship 
between school quality and student attendance/achievement, are inconsistent [Harbision 
and Hanushek (1992); Hanushek (1994); Greenwald, et al. (1996); Mora (1997); 
Behrman, et al. (1997); Alderman, et al. (2001)]. Robust results have been reported by a 
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very few studies from other countries with a lack of consensus on the effects of school 
quality even among these studies. 
What is the role of school quality and other determinants? Two main approaches 
are used in the literature. In the first, cognitive functions are evaluated [Alderman, et al. 
(2001); Arif and Saqib 2003; Das, et al. (2006); Aslam (2009); Sandy and Duncan 
(2010)]. In the second, child school participation is modelled explicitly taking into 
account the schooling options. Alderman, et al. (2001) uses a nested logit framework to 
evaluate the child school participation in government versus private schools in Lahore, 
urban Pakistan. They employ an area-frame sampling methodology and included low-
income areas, measuring household and school level characteristics. They incorporate 
controls for home background and school inputs into the nested logit framework. For 
rural Pakistan no similar exercise has been undertaken. This study provides one, focusing 
on quantifying child’s school participation differences based on school quality provision 
in the two types of schools along with other important determinants. It is important to 
note that the studies of Arif and Saqib (2003), Das, et al. (2006) and Aslam (2009) 
looked for child achievement differences between state and private schools. But the 
research by Alderman, et al. (2001) is the only study that also evaluated child 
participation differences. 
The nested logit framework has been widely used in the education economics 
literature for evaluating school choice decisions in other countries. Meschi, et al. (2011) 
investigates the relative importance of pupil attainment (test score), parental aspiration 
(whether the parent wants his child to stay at school) and local labour market conditions 
(unemployment rate) in post compulsory schooling decisions in England. They conclude 
that child’s educational achievement and parental aspirations are the main drivers of the 
schooling rather than local market conditions.  Checchi and Jappelli (2004) utilise a large 
cross-sectional data set on child’s school attendance in private and public schools in Italy. 
They have information on household income, demographic characteristics, parental 
education and school quality. They control for school quality with an index of the 
subjective assessment of private and public schools by households. Their results show 
that school quality is the main factor in the choice between public and private schools in 
Italy. Private schools in the US are shown to have cream skimming effects;
1
  that is, they 
skim off the most able and wealthiest students [Epple and Romano (2008)]. Also, in the 
United States, the private schooling decision depends on parental education, household 
income, racial composition of public schools, location, and crime rate in the area of 
residence [Lankford, et al. (1995)]. A proxy for school quality ‘expenditure per student 
and tuition fee’ does not affect parental school choice. Buddin, et al. (1998) establish that 
parental characteristics (age, income and education) are the main factors affecting private 
school choice. Proxies for school quality of public and private schools (teacher’s salaries 
and expenditure per student) do not affect this decision. Overall the literature identifies a 
range of factors relevant to the private schooling choice but offers no consensus that 
school quality is the main driving factor affecting school choice decisions, perhaps partly 
because experience varies by country. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of schooling in 
Pakistan. Section 3 describes private-public school data. The nested logit framework is 
 
1Epple and Romano (2008) did not utilise the nested logit framework.  
180 Muhammad Jehangir Khan 
 
presented in Section 4. In Section 5 results of the main econometric findings on child’s 
school participation are discussed. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
2.  EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN: AN OVERVIEW 
Investment in education is a pre-requisite for sustained improvement in the 
wellbeing of individuals and societies. But Pakistan’s social indicators are low in 
comparison to countries at the same level of development. Pakistan lies at the low end of 
Education Development Index (EDI) in the region [NEP (2017)].  
Every child is entitled to free and compulsory education under article 25(A) of the 
Constitution which states that “The state shall provide free and compulsory education to 
all children of the age of 5-16 years in such manner as may be determined by law”. 
Detailed laws and rules have been framed to enforce the said constitutional provision in 
the country but much needs to be done to execute it in true letter and spirit.  
According to Pakistan Education Statistics (PEC) (2015-16) total education 
institutions in the country (from pre-primary to university level) are 303,446, comprising 
191,065 public and 112,381 private institutions. Total enrolment, in both sectors, is 47.49 
million, out of which 27.69 million is in public sector and remaining 19.80 million is in 
private sector institutions. Further disaggregation at the gender level shows that 56 
percent of the total enrolled children are male while 44 percent are female students.  At 
the pre-primary level total enrolment is 8.745 million (public 4.532 million (52 percent) 
and private 4.212 million (48 percent)).   The primary level (I-V) of education in Pakistan 
accommodates 18.75 million children (public 11.461 million (61percent); private 7.290 
million (39 percent)). The middle (VI-VIII) level of education enrols 6.445 million 
children (public 4.039 million (63 percent); private 2.403 million (37 percent)). The 
enrolment at secondary (IX-X) school level is 3.437 million (public 2.227 million (65 
percent); private 1.209 million (35 percent)). Whereas total enrolment at higher 
secondary school level is 1.697 million (public 1.325 million (78 percent); private 0.372 
million (22 percent). 
In Pakistan there are almost 51.17 million children between the ages of 5 and 16 
[PEC (2015-16)]. Out of these, about 28.53 million children go to any educational 
institution (government or private), and the rest (22.64 million children) are out of school. 
According to the available statistics, Pakistan stood 2nd in terms of out of school children 
in the world [NEP (2017)]. The out of school estimate for primary school going age 
children is nearly 5.03 million, while estimates for middle, high and higher secondary 
level are 6.40 million, 4.88 million and 6.33 million, respectively. Not surprisingly, more 
girls are out of school than boys. The under financing of education implies more 
illiterates, low enrolment, high dropout rate and low learning outcomes. 
Spending on education has remained static at around 2 percent (of GDP) for the 
past couple of years, with about 92 percent being spent on salaries (recurrent head), only 
a meagre amount is spent on quality improvements (about 8 percent as development head) 
such as provision of school infrastructure, curriculum development, teachers’ training, 
monitoring and supervision. More than half (64 percent) public sector primary schools 
have electricity. About 60 percent schools have drinking water, 54 percent have latrines, 
and 65 percent are with boundary wall. Nearly 80 percent of private sector primary 
schools are electrified. About 85 percent schools have drinking water facility, 84 percent 
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have latrines, and 81 percent have boundary wall [ASER (2015-16)]. This shows that 
education provision in public sector schools is not satisfactory. Barely 40 percent 
children, in public sector schools, have required competency in mathematics, science and 
languages [NEP (2017)]. Furthermore, public sector education provision also faces the 
problems of gender disparities, inequitable access and high dropouts. In this situation, 
considerable presence of private sector education provision is imperative. Accordingly, 
private sector is supporting the education in Pakistan by accommodating more than 41.69 
percent of the total enrolment in the country, while providing quality education. 
Expenditure on education (percent of GDP) in other countries of the region is 
greater than that in Pakistan. According to Pakistan Economic Survey (2015-16), 
expenditure as percent of GDP is 3.8 percent in India, 6 percent in Bhutan, 4.6 percent in 
Afghanistan and 5.2 percent in Maldives. The low level of education expenditures, as 
percentage of GDP, in Pakistan reveals a big gap in policy and practice. 
 
3.  DATA SOURCE AND SCHOOL CHOICE 
The empirical analysis of this study is based on the Pakistani Rural Household 
Survey, second wave, of 2004-5 (PRHS-II). This data source offers a unique combination 
of child level data and a wide range of school quality indicators, essential for the present 
study. The PRHS-II, was restricted to Punjab and Sindh due to security concern, and is 
comprised of 1614 households. The PRHS-II also interviewed 293 split households
2
 
leading to a sample of 1907 households. The child age range of the present study is 5-15 
years. Some of the PRHS-II households had no children less than 15 years of age. 
Therefore, the final sample is reduced to 1427
3
 households (with 3918 children) spread 
over 94 rural communities (villages).  
The PRHS-II survey collected information on agricultural-related activities, credit, 
employment, and several demographic events as well as households’ consumption 
information for the month preceding the survey.   
PRHS-II is a representative household survey data which combines information 
from a village and school census. The school census contains comprehensive information 
on all schools within each village and schools lying within a 2 km walk of the border of 
each settlement of the village. GPS coordinates were available, so the distance between 
each household and school could be calculated. The school census contains information 
on 1326 schools of which 1112 (84 percent) have classes at the primary level (up to grade 
5). About 63 percent of these schools are solely primary/elementary schools, while the 
rest primary schools were attached to a middle or high school. Government school 
provision is central in determining access to education as nearly three-fourths of primary 
schools are public (90 percent in Sindh province). 
The descriptive statistics based on Pakistan Rural Household Survey (PRHS) 
reported in Table 1 shows that more than half of school age children (51 percent) are not 
 
2A split household is defined as a new household where at least one member of the previous panel 
household has established a new household permanently. The movement of the member from the panel 
household is due to the marriage of a female member or to a son or brother deciding to live separately from the 
panel household. In PRHS, households split only within a sampled village (PSU) were interviewed. Those 
households who split or moved out of the sampled villages were not followed due to high cost involved in this 
process [Arif and Farooq (2012)].   
3667 households in Sindh and 760 households in Punjab. 
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in school. The relevant proportion of enrolled children is 49 percent. Besides, it is shown 
that there are two main school types in Pakistan, government and private. The relevant 
proportion of government school children in the survey is 88.96 percent. Whereas the 
same figure for private schools is 11.04 percent. Private schools are for profit in Pakistan. 
The breakup of enrolled children over the provinces in Table 1 shows that out of 
1708 (88.96 percent) enrolled children in government schools, 901 children are in Punjab 
and 807 children in Sindh. Total number of children enrolled in private schools is 212 
(11.04 percent), of which 199 are in Punjab Province and the remaining 13 children are 
from Sindh. These figures support the FBS (2000) claims/estimates that much of the 
mushrooming of private institutions has happened in Punjab than anywhere else in the 
country in the last two decades.   
 
Table 1 
Enrolment by Province 
  
  
 School Type 
  Enrolment by Province 
 No Yes Total 
 Sindh Punjab Total Sindh Punjab Total Sindh Punjab Total 
No-schooling 
  
Count 1,124 874 1,998 – – – 1,124 874 1,998 
Percent 100 100 100 – – – 57.82 44.28 51.00 
Government 
  
Count – – – 807 901 1708 807 901 1,708 
Percent – – – 98.41 81.91 88.96 41.51 45.64 43.59 
Private 
  
Count – – – 13 199 212 13 199 212 
Percent – – – 1.59 18.09 11.04 0.67 10.08 5.41 
Total 
  
Count 1,124 874 1,998 820 1,100 1,920 1,944 1,974 3,918 
Percent 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Calculated from PRHS-II. 
 
4.  ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
 
4.1.  The Nested Logit Model 
For modelling the outcome variable on child’s school participation, unordered 
nested logit is preferred over other discrete choice models (multinomial or conditional 
logit models) because it relaxes the strong assumption of independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (i.i.a).
4
 The nested logit model is interpreted with the underlying principles of 
utility-based choice theory, the random utility maximisation (RUM) model. Utility
5
 in an 
indicator of value to the decision maker—here the parents—and is derived from the 
attributes of alternatives. The utility maximisation rules state that the decision maker will 
choose the alternative from the available set of alternatives that maximises his/her utility.  
Suppose ‘Uij’ is the true utility to the decision maker ‘i’ from alternative ‘j’. Utility ‘Uij’ 
is the sum of a deterministic (observable) part ‘Vij’ and an unobserved stochastic part ‘ij’; 
            … … … … … … (1) 
 
4The conditional logit model takes into account alternative-specific regressors; however, like the simple 
multinomial logit model it assumes the independence of irrelevant alternatives. The independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (i.i.a) implies that the relative odds between two alternatives are the same no matter what other 
alternatives are available.  
5The utility, here, is referred to the expected utility of the returns to investment in child schooling. 
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The estimated probability ‘ ijP ’ that decision maker ‘i’ selects alternative ‘j’ is equal to 
the probability of ‘Uij’ being the highest of all ‘Ui1,…Uij’. The alternative that the 
decision maker ‘i’ chooses is denoted by  Jyi .....1 . Hence the probability is 
ikijiij UUprojyproP  ()(  ):...,,...1 jkJkj   
ikijijikiij VVprojyproP  ()( ):...,,...1 jkJkj   … (2) 
Different assumptions regarding the distribution of the random error terms  ‘ij’ 
associated with the utility of each alternative, given the observable portion of the utility 
‘Vij’, result in different model representations and predicated choice probabilities 
[Koppelman and Bhat (2006); Cameron and Trivedi (2009)]. The observable portion of 
the utility ‘Vij’ is specified as; 
        
′




 … … … … … … (3) 
Where ‘Xij’ are alternative-specific regressors and ‘Z’ are individual specific regressors. 
Alternative-specific regressors vary over individual as well as alternatives. These 
variables include school quality characteristics of government and private schools 
available to the household. School quality variables have been made to vary by 
alternative, as these inputs may have different productivities in government and private 
schools and important for assessing parental choices between these schools. Similarly, for 
no-school choice the vector of school quality characteristics is a null vector. Alternative-
specific variables accounted for in this study include: 
Xij = (number of schools in the community, student-teacher ratio, toilet facility for 
children, school boundary wall, electrified schools, furniture for students, 
textbooks for students, teacher experience, teacher qualification, schools with 
a playground, schools with a library). 
Whereas, individual-specific regressors describe the characteristics of the decision 
maker. Specifically, individual specific variables accounted for in this study include: 
Zt = (Child sex, child age, own farm animals, own non-farm animals, household 
expenditure, fertility, mother’s level of education, father’s level of education, 
land owned, land owned squared, land ownership dummy, credit constraint, 
province). 
The nested logit model requires that a nesting structure (Dn; n=1, ......, N) be 
specified that partitions the alternatives into groups. Errors are correlated within group 
but uncorrelated across groups. In the present context, the schooling decision is 
partitioned into two nests. Sending children to school modes (Government and Private) 
share the nest DYes = {government, private} and the other mode not sending children to 
school (no-schooling) belong to nest DNo = {no-schooling}. Further details about parental 
decision of child schooling decision are given in Appendix A. 
Specifically, subscripts (   ) denote the alternatives, where j denotes the upper 
level (limb) and k denotes the branch (lower level) within the limb (see Appendix A, 
Figure A1). For instance, (   ) denotes the second alternative in the first limb. 
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         
′
     
′
                                    … … (4) 
Here ′  ′ varies over the limbs and ′   ′ varies over both branches and 
limbs. The subscript ‘i’ for individual is suppressed, for ease of explanation.  In nested 
logit model (       )  are distributed as Gumbel’s multivariate extreme-value 
distribution. The probability that alternative (   ) is selected is equal to; 
                 
    ( 
 
′
        )
∑     (
 
     
′
        )
     
    ( 
  
′
     ⁄ )
∑     (
  
      
′
     ⁄ )
   … … (5) 
Here,      ∑     (
  
      
′
     ⁄ )  is called log sum and ′  ′  called the 
dissimilarity parameters.  
The ‘ j’ characterises the degree of substitutability between government and 
private alternatives, and represents correlation between the unobserved (error) 
components for these two alternatives in the same nest. Its value is bounded by zero and 
one (      ) to ensure consistency with the random utility maximisation principles. 
The values outside this range mean that the model is inconsistent with random utility 
theory. Smaller value of ‘ j’ indicates greater substitution between government and 
private school alternative in the nest. The probability of private school is equal to the 
probability of choosing child schooling times the conditional probability of choosing 
private schooling given that child schooling mode is chosen. Similar interpretation could 
be undertaken for the government school option. 
Estimation involves specifying the alternative-specific regressors ‘Xjk’ and 
individual-specific variables ‘Zj’ (Equation 4) and inserting them into Equation 5. The log 
likelihood for Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation of the model 









Where ‘j’ represent alternative in each nest and ‘D’ denotes the relevant branch/s or 
nest/s. 
 
4.2.  Coefficient Interpretation of Alternative Specific Variables  
Mathematically, the marginal effect of a change in characteristic ‘r’ of alternative 
‘j’ on the likelihood that individual ‘i’ would select alternative ‘k’ (where alternative ‘k’ 
may or may not be equal alternative ‘j’) is given as; 
rikijii PPkjjrXkyprob  ])(1[)|(/][  … … … (6) 
For example, a positive coefficient in the main utility function on one of the 
alternative-specific variables means that if the regressor increases for one category, then 
that category is chosen more and the choice for other categories decreases or chosen less. 
A positive coefficient on the variable ‘Proportion of schools with a textbook for students’ 
means that if the textbook proportion of one of the school options (government or private) 
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increases, then demand for that option increases and demand for other options decreases, 
and vice versa for a negative coefficient. The coefficients of case-specific variables (e.g. 
household expenditure and other socio-economic variables) are interpreted as the 
parameters of a binary logit model against the reference category.  
There are two common ways to estimate the partial effect of a continuous variable 
on the response probability; Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) and Marginal Effects at 
sample Mean (MEMs).
 6
  Greene (2003) shows that the estimates from both AMEs and 
MEMs would be the same in large samples but may not be in moderate and small 
samples. But current practice favours AMEs, when possible, because econometric 
software packages were not supporting or able to calculate AME until recently. 
Therefore, AMEs has also been estimated in this study. 
The definitions of the vector of alternative-specific variables (school quality) and 
vector of case-specific variables (child and household level controls) are given in the 
following. 
 
4.3.  Variable Definitions 
The vector of school quality-related variables includes: number of schools in the 
community, student-teacher ratio, toilet facility for children, school boundary wall, 
electrified schools, furniture for students, textbooks for students, teacher experience, 
teacher qualification, proportion of schools having playground, and proportion of schools 
having library. School availability and accessibility in the community entails significant 
opportunity cost to the parents in terms of child’s time going to and from school to home, 
as well as, if a particular school is not available in the community or nearby community 
with implied characteristics. Greater disutility associated with child’s school farther from 
home and most importantly, travelling to and from school is not productive [Alderman, et 
al. (2001)]. Previous research in the area [as in Alderman, et al. (2001); Ersado (2005)] 
focussed on number of schools to proxy school accessibility/availability. However, even 
if schools are available to individual households in the local area, such schools do not 
have the appropriate quality attributes. Then number of schools alone would not be able 
to proxy school accessibility/availability. In such circumstances, the nearest school would 
have much more disutility to parents than the one a bit farther in the community. 
Therefore, we also control for the aforementioned school quality attributes/capacity 
variables along with the number of schools in the community. These capacity variables 
reflect the educational infrastructure available to all households in the community and 
could be an important determinant in the explanation of child’s school participation. 
However, to distinguish school capacity/infrastructure effect from school crowding effect, 
we also control for the number of pupils per teacher. For instance, few schools might be 
available in a particular community having the implied school quality characteristics but 
might be over crowded due to greater parental evaluation/child participation. 
A variety of variables are used in the literature for capturing school quality, 
including average expenditure per pupil and the student-teacher ratio. Hanushek (1994) 
 
6For computing marginal effects, one usually evaluates Equation (6) at the sample mean of the data 
(Marginal Effect at Sample Means, MEMs). Alternatively, the marginal effects may be evaluated at every 
observation and then these individual marginal effects are averaged across the sample (Average Marginal 
Effects, AMEs). 
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concluded that increase in spending has no positive effects on student achievement/ 
attendance. However, Greenwald, et al. (1996) found that increased spending did 
significantly enhance student performance. 
On the student-teacher ratio, Betts (1996) argues that a reduction in class size 
increases the length of stay of children in school. Reviewing evidence on school quality 
indicators for studies in the United States, especially the student-teacher ratio, Harbision 
and Hanushek (1992), found that out of 152 studies using the student-teacher ratio as a 
school quality indicator, 59 obtained positive effects (coefficients), 48 inferred negative 
effects and results from other 45 studies were undetermined. Mora (1997) has attached 
some other interpretation to the positive and negative coefficient on the student teacher 
ratio. He argues that secondary schools with relatively large student-teacher ratios have 
higher quality as secondary school teachers are more specialised; he refers to it as a 
school scale effect, whereas primary schools with bigger student-teacher ratios have 
lower school quality because teachers are unable to impart basic skills to primary school 
students due to lower interaction. A recent study from urban Lahore in Pakistan by 
Alderman, et al. (2001) found that the student-teacher ratio has positive coefficients in 
both the school attendance and cognitive achievement equations. 
Teacher experience and teacher quality (qualification) have been employed to 
capture the school quality effect on attendance/student achievement as well e.g. see 
Behrman, et al. (1997) for a review. Furthermore, the size of the school has appeared as 
an indicator of school quality. 
In their study for rural Pakistan Behrman, et al. (1997, p. 127)  gave a summary of 
the evidence on school quality indicators, citing a survey of 96 studies for developing 
countries [Harbison and Hanushek (1992)]; none of six common input measures had 
statistically significant positive effects for more than two thirds of the studies and only 
half of them—facilities, teacher education, and expenditure per student (with the last of 
these based on relatively few studies)—had significantly positive effects in half of the 
studies. The student-teacher ratio had significant coefficients in half of the studies, but 
the sign was the opposite of that presumed in half of these significant cases. 
All school quality related variables
7
 are community-level averages/expected values 
of school quality inputs (by school type) used by households in the community (apart 
from number of schools in the community). 
Community-level school quality variables/expected values of school quality inputs 
are used on the ground that these do not reflect the characteristics of the specific school a 
child attends [Alderman, et al. (2001)]. The characteristics of the specific school a child 
attends are determined jointly with the schooling decision, hence are endogenous to 
schooling [Deaton (1988); Alderman, et al. (2001)]. But community-level school quality 
variables/expected values of school quality inputs are not endogenous to household-level 
child schooling decisions [Alderman, et al. (2001);  Ersado (2005)]. 
Alderman, et al. (1996) and Behrman, et al. (2008) assumed the availability and 
quality of local schools as exogenous for their estimates.  The availability and quality of 
 
7Our school quality correlates are village/community level averages of schools in a village and village 
level school quality regressors do not vary within a village. A small error correlation for children in each village 
would lead to a great downward bias in the default standard errors, as well as in heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors. Hence, given the importance of cluster standard errors we estimated cluster standard errors of 
the regression estimators over the villages. 
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local schools are determined by district and higher level decisions and are not in direct 
response to village characteristics and household demands. 
The vector of family attributes contains different household level and child level 
characteristics. Other possible determinants of child schooling include child sex (gender), 
child age, household head age and sex, parental educational level and ownership of 
productive assets such as land and animals [Bhalotra (2003)]. The effect of age on child 
schooling has been reported from many empirical studies as negative and quadratic. 
Child schooling is decreasing in age if child labour productivity is increasing in age. The 
other view is that child labour may get social acceptability or viewed as less harmful as 
the child age advances [Bhalotra (2003)]. A gender differential in child schooling 
participation is measured because of variation in returns to education or remittance 
propensities between boys and girls. 
Parental levels of education of both mothers and fathers are included to allow for 
their possible impact on child schooling and employment [Strauss and Thomas (1995); 
Bhalotra (2007)]. Educated mothers have a greater say in household decision making and 
may increase the efficiency of household resource allocation towards child schooling 
[Bhalotra (2007)]. Also, they may be more altruistic towards their children [Strauss and 
Thomas (1995)]. 
Parental income or wealth is measured by household level income (also known as 
‘household income net of child earnings’) as calculated by Bhalotra (2007). This 
excludes income from child employment to measure household poverty more accurately 
and to avoid endogeneity with child labour, but includes non-labour earnings and savings 
income. The variable has been made consistent over households using the OECD (1982) 
Equivalence Scale [also called Oxford scale,
8
 see Jenkins and Cowell (1994)]. It is 
desirable to utilise more than one indicator. Bhalotra and Heady (2003) reported that the 
children of households having more land are less likely to be in school than work.
9
  
Transaction costs for child labour (family and hired labour are not perfect substitutes) 
mean that a household with more land has an incentive to employ more of its children 
[Alderman, et al. (1996)]. Farm animals typically supply milk and milk products for their 
owners’ consumption and also are a source of income from sale of the surplus. Non-farm 
animals usually provide power for agricultural operations.
10
 The two categories of 
animals have different implications for child activity; child schooling is decreasing in 
farm animals and increasing in non-farm animals [Hou (2010)]. Hence, livestock 
ownership and possession of land
 
variables are included as possible explanatory variables 
for schooling. 
 
8Equivalence scales correct for the fact that the needs of the each household grow with each additional 
member but not proportionally. Needs for space, electricity and so on are not twice as high for a household with 
two members as for a single individual. With equivalence scales each household member is assigned a value in 
proportion to their needs. The OECD equivalence scale or the Oxford scale assigns a value of 1 to the first 
member of the household and of 0.7, 0.5 to each additional adult and child, respectively, in the household. 
Specifically the formula is; CA nnH  )1(1 , where 7.0 and 5.0 and, An  and cn are the number of 
adults and children in the household. 
9Bhalotra and Heady recognise that wealth is often stored as land/other productive assets. Wealth buys 
leisure but it also demands labour; given imperfect labour markets. So in interlocked and imperfect agrarian 
markets; there may be perverse or non-linear relationship of schooling/child labour and wealth.   
10Farm animals include the cow, buffalo, goat and sheep, whereas non-farm animals include the horse, 
donkey, camel and bullock. 
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Income smoothing, from year to year, may matter [Jacoby (1994) and Fuwa, et al. 
(2009)]. But measurement of credit access is problematic [Ersado (2005)]. Distance from 
a commercial bank at the community level is used as proxy for access to the formal credit 
market - while recognising that it may be a poor indicator. A provincial (regional) 
dummy is included to capture spatial variation in labour demand, price and productivity, 
as well as in culture. 
Table 2 shows that 47 percent of the children are female. Majority of the 
households (76 percent) own farm animals. Household income net of child earnings is Rs 
15886 for all children. Average number of children born to a couple is 4.54. Parental 
education is quite low as evident from Table 2. About 44 percent of the households are 
land owners. The average plot size is nearly 4.52 acres. 
Summary statistics for local school quality over the 94 villages are reported in 
Table 3. Public schools are higher in number than private schools.  School quality 
variables show a wide variation between communities. Student-teacher ratio is higher in 
public schools than in private schools. Private schools compared favourably with 
government schools on the available school quality indicators except for playgrounds, 
textbook provision and average teacher experience. Provision of toilet facility, libraries, 
furniture availability for students, potable drinking water facility, black board/chalk, 
electricity in the schools, school boundary wall, is higher in private schools than in the 
public schools.  
 
Table 2 
Mean and Standard Deviation of Child and Household Characteristics 
  All (N=3918) Boys (N=2072) Girls (N=1846) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Child Sex (Female) 0.47 0.50 
    Child Age 9.68 3.18 9.73 3.24 9.63 3.10 
Child Age Squared 103.86 63.49 105.24 65.06 102.31 61.66 
Own Farm Animals (Yes) 0.76 0.43 0.76 0.43 0.76 0.43 
Own Non -Farm Animals (Yes) 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.45 0.26 0.44 
Household Income net of Child Earnings 15886.31 11780.65 16182.68 12141.96 15553.66 11355.50 
Fertility 4.54 1.95 4.45 1.95 4.64 1.94 
Mother's Level of Education 
     Primary 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.26 
Middle  0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.08 
Secondary  0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.11 
Higher Secondary  0.01 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.01 0.08 
Tertiary  0.00 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.02 
Father's Level of Education 
     Primary 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.42 0.24 0.43 
Middle  0.06 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.22 
Secondary  0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.07 0.25 
Higher Secondary  0.03 0.16 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.17 
Tertiary  0.02 0.13 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.14 
Land Owned in Kharif  2004 4.52 12.82 4.85 14.30 4.16 10.91 
Land Ownership Kharif (Yes) 0.44 0.50 0.43 0.50 0.45 0.50 
Distance to Nearest Bank 8.82 6.93 8.85 6.77 8.78 7.12 
Province (Punjab) 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.50 
Source: Calculated from PRHS-II. 
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Table 3 
Mean and Standard Deviation of School Quality Attributes 
  All Schools(N=94) Public (N=93) Private (N=37) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Percentage of schools with a toilet 
facility 61.50 28.31 55.17 29.01 98.65 8.22 
Percentage of schools with a furniture 
for students 73.33 27.20 69.57 30.07 70.90 36.95 
Percentage of schools with a 
blackboard/chalk 90.16 19.03 87.64 20.82 90.99 25.34 
Percentage of schools with a 
playground 40.51 29.84 41.89 32.17 38.29 34.32 
Percentage of schools with a potable 
drinking water facility 65.46 32.20 61.37 33.38 94.73 18.63 
Percentage of schools with a boundary 
wall 61.45 30.17 57.74 29.38 88.51 26.74 
Percentage of schools with a library 21.63 21.55 20.66 22.27 35.99 37.08 
Percentage of schools with textbooks 
for students 74.33 26.89 79.08 25.43 45.95 49.13 
Percentage of electrified schools 51.05 31.23 45.49 31.15 87.75 31.60 
Number of schools in a village 6.65 3.02 4.69 2.61 2.16 1.21 
Student-teacher ratio 34.10 13.08 35.45 13.40 23.52 9.12 
Average no. of teachers with primary 
qualification 0.07 0.20 0.06 0.21 0.14 0.39 
Average no. of teachers with 
secondary qualification 1.24 0.98 1.23 1.02 1.43 1.28 
Average no. of teachers with bachelor 
qualification 4.35 3.83 4.21 4.02 5.65 3.62 
Average no. of teachers with master  
qualification 3.01 4.43 3.13 4.60 2.93 8.10 
Average teacher experience (years) 11.23 7.22 12.46 4.51 5.64 4.19 
Average no. of classrooms per school 2.56 2.42 5.39 3.83 7.94 5.34 
Source: Calculated from PRHS-II. 
 
5.  SCHOOL CHOICE RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section presents results on nested logit multinomial model of child school 
participation in rural Pakistan. Important policy correlates are controlled for in the nested 
model estimation. The model notably identified many variables significantly affecting the 
child schooling decision. It shows the appropriateness of the nesting structure adopted 
that government and private schools are closer substitutes for each other than for the no-
schooling option. (The estimate of ‘ Yes’ is in the range of 0 < ‘ Yes < 1).  
Results on variables (case-specific variables) that are held constant across all three 
choices are reported in the first stage (top part of Table 4). The parameter signs of case-
specific regressors indicate the relative utility from choosing the no-schooling option 
versus the schooling option. Results that allow differential utility across the three 
alternatives, parameter estimates of alternative specific variable, are presented in the 
second stage (bottom part of Table 4). A joint parameter has been estimated for each 
school quality attribute as school quality attributes vary over both alternatives as well as 
individuals. The direct and cross average marginal effects (AMEs) of statistically 
significant alternative specific variable (school quality indicators of government and 
private schools) are also calculated and interpreted subsequently (Tables 5-9). Tables 5 
and 6 present AMEs for all children, Tables 7 and 8 present results for boys, and Table 9 
presents results for girls.  
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Table 4 
Nested Multinomial Logit Model for School Choice in Rural Pakistan  
(All Children, Boys and Girls) 






No School versus School Option     
Child Sex (Female) –0.845*   
 (–7.38)   
Child Age 1.126* 1.365* 0.867* 
 (14.58) (11.98) (6.15) 
Child Age Squared –0.0577* –0.0679* –0.0472* 
 (–14.76) (–12.11) (–6.53) 
Own Farm Animals (Yes) 0.0809 0.0909 0.0553 
 (0.56) (0.58) (0.30) 
Own Non Farm Animals (Yes) 0.0531 –0.0263 0.146 
 (0.41) (–0.16) (0.92) 
Household Income net of Child Earnings (a) 3.825* 3.792* 4.761* 
 (4.27) (3.18) (3.17) 
Household Income net of Child Earnings Square(a) –2.779* –1.531 –5.499* 
 (–2.99) (–1.17) (–2.23) 
Fertility –0.0908* –0.0510+ –0.128* 
 (–3.44) (–1.72) (–3.22) 
Mother's Level of Education 0.611* 0.507* 0.656* 
 (4.46) (2.75) (3.98) 
Father's Level of Education 0.251* 0.254* 0.255* 
 (5.22) (4.15) (4.38) 
Land owned in Kharif 2004 0.0148 0.000660 0.0805* 
 (1.63) (0.03) (2.22) 
Land owned in Kharif Squared 2004 –0.0000713 0.000108 –0.00121 
 (–1.22) (0.50) (–1.52) 
Land Ownership Kharif (Yes) 0.252* 0.377* –0.104 
 (1.99) (2.39) (–0.43) 
Distance to Nearest Bank –0.0159 –0.0109 –0.0220 
 (–1.12) (–0.62) (–1.34) 
Province (Punjab) –0.160 –0.231 0.0562 
 (–0.65) (–0.92) (0.15) 











Average no. of classrooms per school 0.0220 0.0455+ 0.0000985 
 (1.15) (1.91) (0.01) 
Percentage of schools with a toilet facility –0.000783 –0.000310 0.0000865 
 (–0.26) (–0.11) (0.03) 
Percentage of schools with a furniture for students 0.0000325 0.00179 –0.00210 
 (0.01) (0.69) (–1.11) 
Percentage of schools with a blackboard/chalk 0.00529 0.00356 0.00630 
 (1.23) (0.85) (0.99) 
Percentage of schools with a playground 0.000794 0.00249 –0.00170 
 (0.37) (1.24) (–0.67) 
 Continued— 
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Table 4—(Continued) 
Percentage of schools with a potable drinking water 
facility 
0.00154 0.00144 0.00185 
 (0.63) (0.63) (0.68) 
Percentage of schools with a boundary wall 0.00139 –0.000336 0.00237 
 (0.48) (–0.12) (0.68) 
Percentage of schools with a library 0.00220 0.000518 0.00276 
 (0.89) (0.21) (0.77) 
Percentage of schools with textbooks for students 0.00364+ 0.00450* 0.00216 
 (1.93) (2.42) (1.06) 
Percentage of electrified schools 0.00314 0.00241 0.00392 
 (1.05) (0.76) (1.14) 
Number of schools in a village 0.0751* 0.104* 0.0448 
 (2.56) (3.31) (1.44) 
Student-teacher ratio 0.0124* 0.0116* 0.0121+ 
 (2.52) (2.49) (1.69) 
Average no. of teachers with primary qualification 0.332 0.285 0.292 
 (1.24) (1.05) (0.69) 
Average no. of teachers with secondary qualification 0.152+ 0.117 0.148 
 (1.69) (1.48) (0.90) 
Average no. of teachers with bachelor qualification 0.0273 0.0208 0.0342 
 (1.62) (1.11) (1.47) 
Average no. of teachers with master qualification –0.0187+ –0.0181+ –0.0246+ 
 (–1.86) (–1.79) (–1.81) 
Average teacher experience (years) –0.0624* –0.0564* –0.0631+ 
 (–2.65) (–2.61) (–1.75) 
Government    
_cons –7.334* –8.912* –6.326* 
 (–9.95) (–10.15) (–6.35) 
Private    
_cons –8.255* –9.736* –7.251* 
 (–9.28) (–10.08) (–5.15) 
yes_tau    
_cons 0.498* 0.534* 0.358 
 (2.77) (3.06) (1.14) 
no_tau    
_cons 1 1 1 
Wald chi2 573.0 502.9 242.3 
d.f 32 31 31 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No of observations 11754 6216 5538 
No of cases 3918 2072 1846 
Alts per case    
Min 3 3 3 
Avg 3 3 3 
max 3 3 3 
Log pseodolikelihood –2753.22 –1474.17 –1238.24 
t-statistics in parentheses (Std. Err. adjusted for 94 clusters in villages). 
+p< 0.10, *p< 0.05 
aVariable divided by 100000 for estimation. 
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Table 5 
Nested Logit Average Marginal Analysis for Alternative Specific Variables  
(All Children): Government Alternative 
  Summary of d(Pj)/d(Government)     
Variables    School-mode Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
 Number of schools in a community or village Direct effect Government 0.018 0.006 3918 
  Cross effect Private –0.005 0.007 3918 
  Cross effect No-schooling –0.014 0.004 3918 
Student-teacher ratio Direct effect Government 0.0030 0.0010 3918 
  Cross effect Private –0.0008 0.0012 3918 
  Cross effect No-schooling –0.0022 0.0007 3918 
Percentage of schools with textbooks for students Direct effect Government 0.0009 0.0003 3918 
  Cross effect Private –0.0002 0.0003 3918 
  Cross effect No-schooling –0.0007 0.0002 3918 
Average no. of teachers with secondary qualification Direct effect Government 0.036 0.012 3918 
  Cross effect Private –0.009 0.014 3918 
  Cross effect No-schooling –0.027 0.009 3918 
Average no. of teachers with master  qualification Direct effect Government –0.0045 0.0015 3918 
 Cross effect Private 0.0011 0.0018 3918 
 Cross effect No-schooling 0.0034 0.0011 3918 
Average teacher experience (years) Direct effect Government –0.0150 0.0050 3918 
 Cross effect Private 0.0038 0.0059 3918 
 Cross effect No-schooling 0.0112 0.0037 3918 
Note: Calculation based on column 1, Table 4. 
Note: d (Pj)/d (Government) stands for change in the probability of each alternative with respect to a given 
change in the attributes of government school. 
 
Table 6 
Nested Logit Average Marginal Analysis for Alternative Specific Variables 
(All Children): Private Alternative 
 
 Summary of d(Pj)/d(Private)   
Variables   School-mode Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
 Number of schools in a community or village Direct effect Private 0.0060 0.0086 3918 
  Cross effect Government –0.0045 0.0071 3918 
  Cross effect No-schooling –0.0015 0.0024 3918 
 Student-teacher ratio Direct effect Private  0.0010 0.0014 3918 
  Cross effect Government –0.0008 0.0012 3918 
  Cross effect No-schooling –0.0002 0.0004 3918 
Percentage of schools with textbooks for students Direct effect Private  0.0003 0.0004 3918 
  Cross effect Government –0.0002 0.0003 3918 
  Cross effect No-schooling –0.0001 0.0001 3918 
Average no. of teachers with secondary 
qualification 
Direct effect Private  0.012 0.017 3918 
  Cross effect Government –0.009 0.014 3918 
  Cross effect No-schooling –0.003 0.005 3918 
Average no. of teachers with master  qualification Direct effect Private  –0.001 0.002 3918 
 Cross effect Government 0.001 0.002 3918 
 Cross effect No-schooling 0.0004 0.001 3918 
Average teacher experience (years) Direct effect Private  –0.0050 0.0071 3918 
 Cross effect Government 0.0038 0.0059 3918 
 Cross effect No-schooling 0.0012 0.0020 3918 
Note: Calculation based on column 1, Table 4. 
Note: d (Pj)/d (Private) stands for change in the probability of each alternative with respect to a given change in 
the attributes of private school. 
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Table 7 
Nested Logit Average Marginal Analysis for Alternative Specific Variables (Boys): 
Government Alternative 
 
 Summary of d(Pj)/d(Government)  
Variables   School-mode Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
 Number of schools in a community or village Direct effect Government 0.025 0.008 3918 
  Cross effect Private –0.006 0.010 3918 
  Cross effect No-schooling –0.019 0.006 3918 
 Student-teacher ratio Direct effect Government 0.0028 0.0008 3918 
  Cross effect Private –0.0007 0.0011 3918 
  Cross effect No-schooling –0.0021 0.0007 3918 
Percentage of schools with textbooks for 
students 
Direct effect Government 
0.00109 0.00033 3918 
  Cross effect Private –0.00028 0.00041 3918 
  Cross effect No-schooling –0.00081 0.00027 3918 
Average no. of classrooms per school Direct effect Government 0.0110 0.0033 3918 
  Cross effect Private –0.0028 0.0042 3918 
  Cross effect No-schooling –0.0082 0.0027 3918 
Average no. of teachers with master  
qualification 
Direct effect Government 
–0.0044 0.0013 3918 
 Cross effect Private 0.0011 0.0017 3918 
 Cross effect No-schooling 0.0033 0.0011 3918 
Average teacher experience (years) Direct effect Government –0.014 0.004 3918 
 Cross effect Private 0.003 0.005 3918 
 Cross effect No-schooling 0.010 0.003 3918 
Note: Calculation based on column 2, Table 4. 
 
Table 8 
Nested Logit Average Marginal Analysis for Alternative Specific Variables (Boys): 
Private Alternative 
 
 Summary of d(Pj)/d(Private)  
Variables   School-mode Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
 Number of schools in a community or village Direct effect Private 0.008 0.012 3918 
  Cross effect Government –0.006 0.010 3918 
  Cross effect No-schooling –0.002 0.003 3918 
 Student-teacher ratio Direct effect Private 0.0009 0.0013 3918 
  Cross effect Government –0.0007 0.0011 3918 
  Cross effect No-schooling –0.0002 0.0004 3918 
Percentage of schools with textbooks for 
students 
Direct effect Private 
0.00036 0.00050 3918 
  Cross effect Government –0.00028 0.00041 3918 
  Cross effect No-schooling –0.00008 0.00014 3918 
 Average no. of classrooms per school Direct effect Private 0.0037 0.0050 3918 
  Cross effect Government –0.0028 0.0042 3918 
  Cross effect No-schooling –0.0008 0.0014 3918 
Average no. of teachers with master  
qualification 
Direct effect Private 
–0.0015 0.0020 3918 
 Cross effect Government 0.0011 0.0017 3918 
 Cross effect No-schooling 0.0003 0.0006 3918 
Average teacher experience (years) Direct effect Private –0.0045 0.0062 3918 
 Cross effect Government 0.0035 0.0052 3918 
 Cross effect No-schooling 0.0010 0.0018 3918 
Note: Calculation based on column 2, Table 4. 
194 Muhammad Jehangir Khan 
 
Table 9  
Nested Logit Average Marginal Analysis for Alternative Specific Variables (Girls): 
Government and Private Alternative 
 
 Summary of d(Pj)/d(Private)  
Variables   School-mode Mean Std. Dev. Freq. 
Student-teacher ratio  Direct effect Government 0.003 0.001 3918 
  Cross effect Private –0.001 0.002 3918 
  Cross effect No-schooling –0.002 0.001 3918 
Average no. of teachers with master  
qualification 
Direct effect Government –0.0061 0.0028 3918 
 Cross effect Private 0.0018 0.0031 3918 
 Cross effect No-schooling 0.0042 0.0015 3918 
Average teacher experience (years) Direct effect Government –0.016 0.007 3918 
 Cross effect Private 0.005 0.008 3918 
 Cross effect No-schooling 0.011 0.004 3918 
 Summary of d(Pj)/d(Private) 
 Student-teacher ratio Direct effect Private 0.0012 0.0018 3918 
  Cross effect Government –0.0009 0.0015 3918 
  Cross effect No-schooling –0.0003 0.0005 3918 
Average no. of teachers with master  
qualification 
Direct effect Private –0.0024 0.0036 3918 
 Cross effect Government 0.0018 0.0030 3918 
 Cross effect No-schooling 0.0005 0.0009 3918 
Average teacher experience (years) Direct effect Private –0.0061 0.0093 3918 
 Cross effect Government 0.0047 0.0078 3918 
 Cross effect No-schooling 0.0013 0.0024 3918 
Note: Calculation based on column 3, Table 4. 
 
School Choice (All Children, Boys and Girls) 
Table 4 column (1) reports estimates on school choice while controlling for family 
background and correlates on school quality. 
In Table 4, school-mode choice
11
 is a dependant dummy variable coded 0/1 and is 
important for modelling differential utility across the nested alternatives; namely 
government, private and no schooling. One parameter estimate is identified for each 
alternative-specific variable as these vary across individuals as well as alternatives. 
However, direct and cross-marginal effects of the reported parameters are calculated 
henceforth for a detailed explanation.  
The dissimilarity parameter ‘ Yes’ is within the unit interval and corresponds to a 
correlation of about 0.49 between the error terms of government and private school 
alternatives (Table 4, column 1). 
Girls are less likely to be in school than boys (Table 4, column 1). Schooling 
increases in child age but non-linearly. Relative to the probability of no-schooling, an 
increase in income leads to an increase in the probability of child schooling. However, 
the relationship holds non-linearly. The probability of child schooling decreases with 
 
11It is also possible to estimate school-mode equation. Variable school-mode model the relative utility 
of case-specific variables from selecting the no school option versus the government and private school options. 
School quality variables could either go to the school-mode choice equation as alternative specific variables or 
as case specific variables to the school-mode equation but not both. Modelling school quality though school-
mode choice equation permits estimating differential utility across the nested alternatives. 
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couple level fertility. Parental education is important for child schooling. Relative to the 
probability of no-schooling, an increase in parental education leads to an increase in child 
education. The effect of household plot size on child schooling, relative to no-schooling, 
is significant only in the case of girls (column 3). Girls’ schooling increases in household 
plot size unlike boys. Households having more land are able or willing to finance their 
daughter’s education. The variable measuring access to credit (distance to the nearest 
bank) has no effect on child schooling. The estimated coefficient has the implied sign 
(negative) but insignificant. 
The coefficients on control for number of schools and school quality variable, 
percentage of schools with textbooks for students, is positive and significant for all 
children and boys only sample. When the percentage of free textbooks in private schools 
increases, then demand for private schooling increases and demand for government and 
no-schooling decreases. The coefficient on student teacher-ratio is positive and 
significant for the whole sample as well as for boys and girls. Similarly, when student 
teacher-ratio in private schools increases, then private schooling is chosen more than 
government and no-schooling options. The parameter estimate of variable (average 
number of teachers with secondary qualification) is significant only in the case of all 
children regression. The coefficients on variables average number of teachers with 
masters degree and average teacher experience per school are negative and significantly 
different from zero in all three equations. 
 
Average Marginal Effects of Alternative Specific Variables (All Children) 
Average marginal effects (AMEs) of alternative specific variables (school 
quality attributes) and control for number of schools are presented in Tables 5 and 6 for 
government and private schooling alternative, respectively. All own (direct) effects are 
positive and all cross effects are negative. Referring to Table 5, the probability of 
government schooling marginally increases (by 0.0009 percent)
12
 with a small rise in 
the textbook provision percentage in government schools, while keeping all other 
variables at the sample mean. Similarly, the cross-derivative shows that with the same 
small rise in textbook percentage in government schools, the probability of private 
schooling and no-schooling falls by 0.0002 and 0.0007 percent, respectively. The 
interpretation of parameter estimates of direct and cross derivatives for average number 
of teachers with secondary qualification remains the same as for textbook percentage; 
however, the small increase in number of teacher with secondary qualification have 
bigger marginal impact than the same small increase in textbook percentage. Similarly, 
the probability of government schooling marginally increases (by 0.018 percent) with a 
small rise in the number of government schools in a community, while keeping all 
other variables at the sample mean. Similarly, the cross-derivative shows that with a 
small increase in government schools, the probability of private schooling and no-
schooling falls by 0.05 and 0.14 percent, respectively. Table 6 reports average marginal 
effects (AMEs) with respect to private school attributes. The probability of private 
schooling marginally increases (by 0.0003 percent) with a small rise in the textbook 
 
12 As X (e.g. a school quality indicator) is in percent and Y is enrolment probability. Changing X by 
100 percent means that the enrolment changes by 0.09 percent.   
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percentage in private schools, while keeping all other variables at the sample mean. 
Similarly, the cross-derivative shows that with the same small rise in textbook 
percentage in private schools, the probability of government schooling and no-
schooling falls by 0.0002 and 0.0001 percent, respectively. The parameter estimates of 
average number of teachers per school with secondary qualification (direct and cross 
marginal effects) are interpreted similarly as for textbook percentage. However, a small 
rise in the number of teachers with secondary qualification has a bigger marginal 
impact than the same small rise in textbook percentage (Table 6). Also, the probability 
of private schooling marginally increases by (0.006 percent) with a small rise in the 
number of private schools in a community, while keeping all other variables at the 
sample mean. Similarly, the cross-derivative shows that with a small increase in private 
schools, the probability of government schooling and no-schooling decreases by 0.0045 
and 0.0015 percent, respectively. An important observation follows from these direct 
and cross marginal effects for government and private school’s quality attributes. 
Marginal improvements in quality of either private or government schools are equally 
likely to displace each other’s children. However, a marginal increase in school quality 
correlates with increased school attendance in government schools more than in private 
schools. 
 
Average Marginal Effects of Alternative-Specific Variables (Boys)  
Average marginal effects (AMEs) of school quality attributes are presented in Tables 7 
and 8 for government and private schools, respectively. All direct effects are positive and 
cross effects are negative. Referring to Table 7, the probability of government schooling 
marginally increases (by 0.0011 percent) with a small rise in the textbook provision 
percentage in government schools, while keeping all other variables at the sample mean. 
Similarly, the cross-derivative shows that with the same small rise in textbook percentage in 
government schools, the probability of private schooling and no-schooling falls by 0.00028 
and 0.00081 percent, respectively. The interpretation of parameter estimates of direct and 
cross derivatives for student teacher-ratio, average number of classrooms per school in the 
community and control for number of government schools in a community remain the same 
as in the case of whole sample analysis.  
Table 8 reports average marginal effects (AMEs) with respect to private school 
attributes. The probability of private schooling marginally increases (by 0.00036 percent) 
with a small rise in the textbook percentage in private schools, while keeping all other 
variables at the sample mean. Similarly, the cross-derivative shows that with the same 
small rise in textbook percentage in private schools, the probability of government 
schooling and no-schooling falls by 0.00028 and 0.00008 percent, respectively. Overall 
the AMEs for boys display similar behaviour as is the case of whole sample estimates; a 
marginal increase in school quality correlates with increased school attendance for boys 
in government schools more than in private schools. 
 
Average Marginal Effects of Alternative Specific Variables (Girls) 
Nearly all school quality variables including control for number of schools in a 
community are statistically not different from zero in the case of girls. Student 
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teacher-ratio is significant, while average number of teachers with masters degree 
and average teacher experience (years) are significant only at 10 percent level of 
significance. This shows that other factors might be of more importance than school 
quality of local schools for low attendance of girls in rural Pakistan. Average 
marginal effects (AMEs) for student teacher-ratio, average number of teachers with 
masters degree and average teacher experience (years) are presented in Table 9 for 
government and private schools respectively. All the direct effects are positive and 
cross effects are negative. In Table 9, the probability of government schooling 
marginally increases (by 0.003 percent) with a small rise in student teacher-ratio in 
government schools, while keeping all other variables at the sample mean. Similarly, 
the cross-derivative shows that with the same small rise in student teacher ratio in 
government schools, the probability of private schooling and no-schooling falls by 
0.001 and 0.002 percent, respectively. 
Average marginal effects (AMEs) with respect to private school attributes are 
provided in the same Table. The probability of private schooling marginally 
increases (by 0.0012 percent) with a small rise in student teacher-ratio in private 
schools, while keeping all other variables at the sample mean. Similarly, the cross-
derivative shows that with the same small rise in student teacher-ratio in private 
schools, the probability of government schooling and no-schooling falls by 0.0009 
and 0.0003 percent, respectively.  
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper has been to investigate the role of school quality in parental 
schooling decisions for their children in Rural Pakistan. Research from the perspective of 
public and private school phenomenon is lacking in rural Pakistan. This study uses a rich 
set of households and school data (nationally representative data of rural Pakistan) to 
conduct a comprehensive investigation of the factors that have been ignored in previous 
research. The analysis confirms that lower school attendance of boys seems to be the 
outcome of lower school quality than girls. The greater the number of schools (public or 
private) in the local communities the higher is the attendance. Class size also seems to be 
important for raising school attendance in rural Pakistan; however, the estimated 
coefficient is positive.  Free textbooks provision to students is also important for 
improving school attendance in either public or private school. Teacher qualification also 
positively impacts all children attendance. Nearly all school quality variables including 
control for number of schools in a community are insignificant for girls. This shows that 
other factors might be more important than school quality in explaining low attendance of 
girls in rural Pakistan.  
Furthermore, the result also shows substitution in enrolment, whereby increase in 
enrolments of one sector (public or private) leads to a decline in the share of the other.  
Both sectors are equally likely to displace each other’s child enrolment. The magnitude of 
the coefficients on public school quality indicators is larger than the magnitude of the 
coefficients on private school quality indicators for the choice of enrolment in school. A 
marginal increase in school quality correlates with increased school attendance in 
government schools more than in private schools. The incremental benefits from 
improving state schools are much higher because the initial average quality is so low. 
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Improving the quality of public schools would require several considerations. First, 
research is needed on how best to improve school quality in rural Pakistan. Second, the 
role of school inputs provision needs to be investigated further to check whether school 
inputs really make a school more attractive; the most effectivee way to do this is to 
administer a randomised trial that provides school inputs to randomly selected schools. 
Third, the competence and willingness of the state authorities to improve state school 
quality are important. Fourth, there is a need to assess the balance of costs and benefits of 
raising school quality in state schools versus alternative programmes such as distributing 
subsidies to low income families to pay private school fees. The distributional 
consequences of this particular alternative are likely to be unacceptable to children who 
continue to be educated in state schools and continue to receive poor quality education. 
Fifth, the feasibility of public-private partnerships in schooling needs to be checked. 
Finally, once children are in school they must get the skills important for their life when 
they finish their schooling, therefore, more needs to be learned on how to make schools 
more effective in imparting important skills to children.  
As far as individual and household factors are concerned, parental education, 
especially mother’s education and household income have strong positive impact on child 
school attendance. Most recently, Andrabi, Das, and Khwaja (2012) also found in the case 
of Pakistan that educated mothers spend more time with their children and make certain that 
their children devote more time on homework when at home. In addition, the greater the 
number of children in the household the lower is the child school attendance. Credit 
constraint seems to be not problematic as the estimated effect is statistically insignificant.  
Size of landholding seems to be important only in the case of girls’ schooling.  
 
APPENDIX A 
Generally the choice set is partitioned into ‘N’ subsets (nests) ‘ nD ’, n=1,......, N. 
The present case involves only one nesting level. Each available alternative in the choice 
set belong to exactly one nest. Nest ‘ )( jD ’ to which alternative j=1,.....,J belongs is 
denoted as; 
 NnDjDjD nn ,........1,:)(   … … … … … (5) 
In the context of the present study, parental decision of child school participation 
is depicted in Figure 1. The schooling decision is partitioned into two nests (N=2). 
Sending children to school modes (Government and Private) share the nest 
 privategovernmentDYes , and the other mode not sending children to school (no-
schooling) belong to nest  schoolingnoDNo  . Private and government schooling 
alternatives are more similar to each other than no-schooling alternative. Usually it is 
viewed convenient to interpret the choice as if there are two levels of decision; however, 
the derivation of nested logit model does not make such an assumption. The decision tree 
(Figure 1) and the hierarchy of choice are purely analytical devices and do not imply that 
a decision maker makes decision in certain order [Borsch-Supan (1987), cited in 
Koppelman and Bhat (2006), p.160]. Figure 1 shows an upper level (marginal) choice 
between going to school and not going to school and a lower level (conditional) choice 
between government and private schooling, given that going to school is chosen.  
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This representation is based on the assumption that some of the alternatives share 
common components in the error terms. The error term in the nested logit model is 
decomposed into a portion associated with each alternative and a portion associated with 
the group of alternatives in the same nest. 
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